
# Why Centrism Fails and How We Can **Better Achieve Political Cooperation**



MAGNETIC FIELDS

By Steve McIntosh J.D.

A Publication of The Institute for Cultural Evolution May, 2016

# Why Centrism Fails and How We Can Better Achieve Political Cooperation

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Hyper-partisan political polarization is crippling America's democracy. Even if our next president is elected with a strong majority mandate, she or he will nevertheless find themselves severely constrained by the inevitably obstructionist opposition. As Francis Fukuyama observes in his latest book, *Political Order and Political Decay*, America's government has become a 'vetocracy' wherein our system of checks and balances has devolved to the point where each party has an effective veto on the positive programs of the other. And within our evenly balanced, highly competitive two party system, this has produced a seemingly intractable form of gridlock that now paralyzes our government.

In response to the problem of hyper-partisan polarization, mainstream political commentators and analysts usually prescribe some version of centrism. Prominent centrists contend that the straightforward solution to polarization is for politicians to 'meet in the middle' and compromise for the greater good. These moderates argue that most Americans are not ideologically polarized, and that our government's gridlock has been artificially created by structural obstacles to cooperation, such as congressional district gerrymandering and the outsized influence of hyper-partisans in primary elections and campaign finance.

Centrists have outlined policy positions designed to appeal to both sides on a wide variety of issues, and they are encouraged by the growing number of voters who identify as independent. Indeed, national polls seem to indicate that if any truly centrist presidential candidate could make it past the primaries, their election would be virtually assured. Yet if centrism is so politically desirable and potentially achievable, why does it continue to fail to succeed? Why are we more polarized now than at any time since the civil war? It's not as if this problem has only appeared recently; this contemporary version of hyper-partisan gridlock has been paralyzing our democracy for over twenty years.

Notwithstanding these concerns, I remain sympathetic to the laudable goals of centrism. Returning to a spirit of bipartisan cooperation, pragmatically focusing on getting things done,

and rejecting ideological purity in favor of realistic moderation, are all seemingly reasonable prescriptions for ameliorating our polarization problem. But again, despite the logical appeal of these centrist remedies, even after decades of high-level advocacy for this approach, hyperpartisanship continues to prevail.

We know from history that a political culture of cooperative moderation is possible in America. The postwar period from 1945 until about 1968, known as the 'liberal consensus,' was characterized by exemplary cooperation through which significant legislative achievements were accomplished. The cultural conditions that made this period of consensus possible, however, were disrupted (for good and bad) by the upheavals that began in the 1960s, and which have now permanently altered the cultural landscape of American politics. Since then, a significant portion of Americans have come to adopt a new set of values that are often opposed to the mainstream establishment values which once served as the foundation of our nation's relative political solidarity. And this points to the conclusion that polarization is primarily a cultural problem that ultimately requires a cultural solution.

#### The Problem with Centrism

The problem with contemporary political centrism is that it remains rooted in a worldview that is in the process of being superseded by the progress of history. While this mainstream worldview (usually called 'modernity' or 'modernism') continues to constitute the cultural center of gravity for most of the American electorate, it can no longer serve as a stable center. It is being increasingly pulled apart on both sides by competing moral systems—a cultural tug of war between the enduring values of the traditional worldview that preceded modernity, and the emerging values of a progressive 'postmodern' worldview that now seeks to transcend the culture of modernity.

Modernist values include scientific rationality, economic prosperity, meritocracy, and individual liberty. These values, which originally emerged during the Enlightenment, provide many of the core principles on which the American nation was founded. These mainstream values will undoubtedly continue to guide a significant part of American culture well into the future. But as I argue in this paper, modernity's former power to engender loyalty and foster political will is being eroded by a growing number of citizens who question many of modernity's deeply held assumptions about economic growth and what it means to succeed and live a good life. And these cultural developments are resetting the 'center' of American politics in a way that calls for a larger container—a 'post-postmodern' or 'metamodern' worldview that can integrate a wider spectrum of values and thus provide a higher form of 'centrism' which can restore some degree of political cooperation.

As I discuss in greater detail elsewhere,<sup>1</sup> throughout America's history modernity has had to contend with the older and distinct worldview most often referred to as 'traditionalism.' Yet

while traditionalists have often stood in opposition to modernity's progress on issues such as women's rights, civil rights, immigration policy, and the separation of church and state, by the time of the postwar liberal consensus, modernism and traditionalism had reached something of a cultural truce. Under this tacit cultural agreement, the political contest between liberals and conservatives was effectively constrained by the socially conservative, traditionalist morality defined by America's Judeo-Christian heritage. But as mentioned, beginning in the 1960s a third major worldview has emerged in American culture. This progressive

countercultural worldview, which for descriptive purposes I will refer to as 'postmodernism,' now competes with traditionalism to define the morality of the modernist majority.

This cultural contest for the moral soul of modernity, which has been waged between progressive postmodernists and socially conservative traditionalists for the last fifty years, may seem to place modernism

Centrism cannot generate passion for its positions or resist the pull of passionate partisans from one side or the other

squarely in the center. But as the political and cultural power of traditionalism wanes, and postmodernism continues to gain ground (as evidenced by Bernie Sanders' surprisingly large constituency<sup>3</sup>), the old modernist center has lost the ideological gravity necessary to garner the allegiance of voters within America's increasingly divergent cultural landscape.

As the 2016 presidential contest demonstrates, passion for change is driving American politics. But as centrist proponents themselves sometimes admit, centrism's largest deficiency is its inability to generate much passion for its positions, or to otherwise resist the pull of passionate partisans from one side or the other.<sup>4</sup> Centrism's commendable emphasis on moderation makes it relativistic in its very constitution—the center is defined by the relative middle of the left and the right. Yet as 'the middle' continues to shift, centrist positions can become untenable. While many centrists like to think of themselves as fiscally conservative and socially liberal, by this logic Donald Trump's supporters, who are mostly fiscally liberal and socially conservative, could also claim to represent the 'sensible center.' As the leftist political commentator George Lakoff writes:

There is no middle in American politics. There are moderates, but there is no ideology of the moderate, no single ideology that all moderates agree on. A moderate conservative has some progressive positions on issues, though they vary from person to person. Similarly, a moderate progressive has some conservative positions on issues, again varying from person to person. In short, moderates have both political moral worldviews, but mostly use one of them.<sup>5</sup>

This conclusion is borne out by social science research which shows that despite the large number of voters who now register as independent, most independents reliably lean to one side or another, and are actually more partisan than the least politically engaged members of either the Democratic or Republican parties.<sup>6</sup>

The political philosophy of centrism is thus unable to overcome polarization because its cultural foundations are no longer strong enough to pull voters into the moderate middle. Attempts to promote a vibrant 'third way' or an ideologically potent 'radical center' include carefully worked out policy recommendations and sophisticated issue positions. But as commentator Mark Satin writes, centrism has "no animating passion ... and there's never been a social movement without an animating passion. [Centrists] have given us plenty of beef—but where's the juice?"<sup>7</sup>

# The Disrupting Influence of the Progressive Postmodern Worldview

During America's historical liberal consensus, the left and the right were better able to effectively work together because most of the electorate shared the same basic worldview of modernism, which as mentioned, was in a temporarily stable truce with traditionalism. Then as now, modernism was fairly evenly divided between liberals and conservatives. Yet unlike now, modernism's moral system was supplied primarily by the traditional worldview. Within this cultural agreement between modernism and traditionalism, strong nationalistic patriotism flourished. And it was this strong sense of non-ironic patriotism that provided the underpinning ideology that justified moderation and cooperation for the greater good of the country. In other words, prior to the rise of contemporary progressivism, modernism's cultural center was rooted in a stable ideology that rarely questioned the moral legitimacy of American society. And this made political compromise and bipartisan cooperation much easier to achieve than it is today.

But then as progressive postmodernism emerged as a political force in the late sixties and early seventies, the left evolved. While old school socialist progressives played a small part in American politics throughout the twentieth century, this new countercultural left offered a fresh kind of progressive politics that seemed more attractive, more liberating, and more fun than older forms of leftism. By the nineties, this postmodern demographic had grown beyond its countercultural roots to comprise approximately twenty-percent of the US electorate. But despite its growing numbers, by 2000 its political influence was largely limited to playing the spoiler role through its support of Ralph Nader's candidacy; without whom George W. Bush would not have become president. Now, however, as the millennial generation has come of age, the near-success of an authentically postmodern candidate like Bernie Sanders demonstrates that postmodernism is a political force to be reckoned with.

While postmodern progressives share some of the liberal values of the modernist Democratic party, they also diverge from liberals on issues such as environmental priority, the proper role of the military, the desirability of economic globalization, and the extent to which the government should redistribute wealth. But beyond liberal and progressive disagreements on specific issues and policies, there is a larger cultural difference that goes to the heart of

centrism's decreasing ideological viability: Most postmodernists are highly suspicious of nationalism and patriotism. As conservative historian George Nash observes, there has been a "rise in recent years of a post-national, even anti-national, sensibility among our progressive elites and young people steeped in multiculturalism."

Postmodernists espouse a worldcentric morality that seeks to transcend the perceived limitations of both ethnocentric traditionalism and nationalistic modernity. The result is a noble desire to be in sympathy and solidarity with the oppressed and disadvantaged peoples of the world. And this global ethic leaves many postmodernists conflicted regarding their

patriotism for America. Moreover, the most committed postmodernists have no such ambivalence about American patriotism; these progressives eschew national loyalty altogether and instead embrace what can be characterized as a kind of *reverse patriotism*.

Reverse patriotism, which consistently takes a dim view of America's economic system and its role in international affairs, has now come to replace patriotism in the minds of those who are more ashamed of America's shortcomings and perceived crimes than they are proud of her national achievements. And in the same way that

The most effective remedy for postmodernism's 'creative destruction' of the modernist center is to work for further cultural evolution

old fashioned patriotism is ideologically potent—generating strong political will—reverse patriotism offers a similar yet opposite kind of righteous cause to believe in and sacrifice for.<sup>10</sup>

Within progressive culture there are many celebrated voices who view the American nation as something akin to a criminal enterprise, and this has made old fashioned patriotism seem 'uncool' to many millennials. Even though most postmodernists still care about America and want to improve it, their vision of improvement often involves fundamentally changing the system. And this means that progressives usually have little interest in compromising with the modernist establishment or otherwise supporting centrist policy proposals. This general unwillingness to cooperate with the pragmatic establishment is seen, for example, in the postmodern left's rejection of Barack Obama's leadership. Within postmodern political discourse Obama is often condemned as a betrayer, or as a tool of corporate interests.

Nevertheless, from a developmental perspective, the ongoing rise of the progressive postmodern worldview as a cultural and political force is not entirely negative. Progressive activism has been commendably successful in increasing concern for the environment, and in reducing racism, sexism, and homophobia in America. And even for those who see progressive postmodernism as a misguided ideology and a threat to America's future, there is still no denying that it continues to grow while traditionalism's cultural authority and political power decreases.

Modernism is not the end of history. And the next historically significant worldview that will eventually come to supersede modernism must inevitably begin by pushing off against modernity's shortcomings by staking out a position of cultural antithesis to the mainstream establishment. Even though the emerging postmodern worldview may still be far from a governing majority, its cultural influence alone is permanently changing America's political landscape, and draining away the ideological legitimacy of the once vibrant modernist center.

# Transcending Postmodernism Through a More Inclusive Worldview

There's no doubt that progressive postmodernism is here to stay. While conservative rearguard defensive action against this cultural development may seem warranted to many, in most cases strongly condemning progressive culture only makes it more visible and attractive. Those who stridently rail against it can end up making it even more appealing as a countercultural alternative to the increasingly unpopular mainstream establishment. Moreover, as the Republican party has moved rightward over the past twenty years—partially in response to the growth of postmodernism—this has made the centrist alternative to progressive politics even less viable by increasing polarization from the other side.

Therefore, rather than resisting it, the best response to the cultural challenge of postmodernism is to help this emerging demographic segment actually develop further and mature beyond its position of antithesis into a more synthetic cultural stance that can better appreciate the best of what has come before. Stated otherwise, the most effective remedy for postmodernism's 'creative destruction' of the modernist center is to work for further cultural evolution by fostering the emergence of a kind of 'post-postmodern' or integrative worldview that can better appreciate and use the positive values of all three of America's existing major worldviews: traditionalism, modernism, and postmodernism.

As evidenced by the growing ideological censorship in America's universities, as postmodernism gains political ground its demands often become more strident and radical. And as postmodern culture accordingly becomes ever more antithetical to the mainstream, this increasingly exposes the inherent limitations of postmodernism as a system of values. Although some progressives would like to completely supplant the values of traditionalism and modernism with their own set of values, postmodern culture actually depends on the ongoing viability of modernism to maintain the kind of wealthy society that postmodern culture requires for its own sustainability. Likewise, the culture of modernism in turn depends on the ongoing viability of traditional values such as fair play, decency, honesty, and respect for rightful authority—values which keep modernism from becoming dysfunctionally corrupt.

From a developmental perspective, contemporary American culture can thus be seen as a kind of interdependent ecosystem in which ongoing regard for the value accomplishments

of each of its major worldviews is necessary for the health and vitality of the cultural system as a whole. That is, to keep our society from stagnating or falling apart, we need to preserve the best of the past (by holding onto healthy traditional values), while imagining a more just and inclusive future (by embracing the liberating potential of some of postmodernism's aspirations). While modernity did effectively integrate traditional values during the postwar liberal consensus, it has a much harder time integrating postmodern values because of postmodernism's ingrained anti-modernist sensibilities. In short, the old 'modernist thesis' cannot contain the coming 'post-postmodern synthesis' that our further cultural and political progress now requires.

# A New Political Practice—Increasing the Scope of What We Can Value

This emerging post-postmodern worldview's approach to politics involves working to overcome polarization by increasing the scope of what people are able to value. Enlarging voters' horizon of acceptable values involves the practice of seeing how each of America's competing value systems (shown below) stand for positive and enduring values that our civilization needs. And crucially, this practice of values integration also involves better recognizing the shadow side of each of these value systems—shortcomings and pathologies that result from, and are tied directly to that system's positive values.

The two figures below chart America's four major value systems, which are divided across the overly simplistic but still relevant left-right spectrum. On the left (figure 1), postmodernism's values and accompanying shortcomings are shown in green, with

modernism's liberal values shown in blue. And on the right (figure 2), traditional values are on the far right in yellow, with modernity's libertarian and conservative values shown in red.

Most Americans already hold some of the values of each of these systems, but the state of our hyperpolarized political culture also reveals the extent to which these value systems are in conflict and competition with one another. Overcoming polarization at its cultural foundations accordingly involves helping each camp see more of the virtue

Overcoming polarization involves the practice of distinguishing each system's positive values from its potential pathologies—teasing apart the 'dignities from the disasters'

of the others. And this in turn involves the practice of distinguishing each system's positive values from its potential pathologies—teasing apart the dignities from the disasters.

Under our highly polarized cultural condition, most partisans can only see the downsides of the value systems they oppose. So the new political practice of value integration starts with a willingness to acknowledge the extent to which each value system continues to advance

goals and virtues that are indispensable for our civilization—each of these major worldviews is making an ongoing and needed contribution to America's cultural ecosystem.

Moreover, where values systems clash we can find in that very conflict a kind of interdependence wherein the strengths of each side can serve to mitigate the potential downsides of the systems they oppose. For example, postmodernism's worldcentric morality provides a remedy for traditionalism's bigoted nativism, and traditionalism's patriotic loyalty can help counter postmodernism's radical anti-modernism.

This political practice of values integration—increasing the scope of what we can value—also seeks to avoid value relativism on one side, and value absolutism on the other. It does this by recognizing how each value system has arisen in history to solve a given set of problematic life conditions. And most of these problems are still with us. So an integrative approach to politics involves using the value solutions of each major system like tools in our policy toolbox. If the problem is economic stagnation, then 'liberty values' (shown in figure 2) may help, and if the problem is a shrinking middle class, then liberal 'fairness values' solutions (shown in figure 1) may prove useful. Unlike rigid partisans who are ideologically constrained from ever adopting the solutions of the other side, an integrative perspective can employ a wider spectrum of remedial policies. For example, rather than seeing goals such as 'smaller government' or 'increased taxes' as universal solutions to be sought in almost all cases, an integrative political perspective is free to use both of these opposing solutions depending on the circumstances.

This new practice of values integration is really a 'higher form of centrism,' which can be clearly distinguished from old fashioned modernist centrism. Rather than seeking to *contract* values by 'disempowering the wingnuts,' as advocated by many prominent modernist centrists, an integrative approach seeks to *expand* values. This integrative political perspective can better recognize why we need, and how we can use, not only the values of the moderate modernist center, but also the positive values of the outlying worldviews of both traditionalism and postmodernism. While both of these outlying worldviews include destructive extremists, these worldviews are also the source of values that we cannot do without. So again, we have to try to tease apart the dignities from the disasters. It is thus by expanding the range of what we can value through an integrative political practice—by increasing our 'value metabolism'—that this higher form of centrism can harness the ideological energy needed to better resist the strong lure which currently pulls voters into polarized and uncooperative camps.

The cultural solution to hyper-partisan polarization accordingly involves working to create a more inclusive agreement—a larger cultural container—that is sympathetic to both the nationalistic loyalties of traditional patriotism and the worldcentric, liberating aspirations of progressive postmodernism.

	'Liberation Values'	'Fairness Values'
Political Goals and Values	Protect the environment above all else Champion social justice and worldcentric morality  Promote multiculturalism and strong affirmative action  Promote feminism and total equality  Promote localism and natural lifestyle  Expose America's past abuses and question globalization	Champion the working and middle class against big business  Protect the rights and interests of minorities and women  Foster America's economic and scientific growth and its global influence  Promote liberal values internationally while limiting military force  Use government to ameliorate social ills and ensure none in need
Potential Deficiencies and Pathologies	Anti-modernism and reverse patriotism Radical rejection of social institutions Can promote anti-government anarchy Magical thinking and narcissism Self-righteous scolding Cultural cognition and tribalism	Bloated government bureaucracy Captured by special interests Relativistic and indecisive Can be scientistic and hostile to religion Results in crony capitalism Cultural cognition and tribalism
	Progressive Postmodernists	<b>Liberal Modernists</b>

Figure 1. Major value systems on the Left: 'Liberation Values' and 'Fairness Values'

	'Liberty Values'	'Heritage Values'
Political Goals and Values	Protect sovereign rights of individuals to think and act as they choose Champion spontaneous order that arises from free markets Promote entrepreneurship and economic self-sufficiency Champion limited government, private property and personal privacy Protect individual freedom from interference by the collective	Promote patriotic love for America and its national interests  Champion America's Judeo-Christian heritage and focus on family  Encourage ethnic assimilation and opportunities for upward mobility  Stand against threats to Western civilization  Promote industriousness, proportionality, and equitable just deserts
Potential Deficiencies and Pathologies	Potential for indifferent elitism and selfish exploitation Can promote anti-government anarchy Can drift toward social Darwinism Can be ideologically rigid and doctrinaire Cultural cognition and tribalism	Bigoted nativism, racism and sexism Jingoistic warmongering Oppressive authoritarianism Parochial resistance to greater inclusion and moral evolution Anti-science and penchant for fundamentalism Cultural cognition and tribalism
	Fiscally Conservative & Libertarian Modernists	Socially Conservative Modernists & Traditionalists

Figure 2. Major value systems on the Right: 'Liberty Values' and 'Heritage Values'

# **Examples of Values Integration in Specific Political Issues**

Beyond merely recognizing how different value systems are uniquely suited to solve discrete sets of problems, the practice of values integration can show us how to craft legislation and policy positions that have a better chance of being enacted. Gaining a clearer and deeper understanding of the *bedrock of values* that underlie our polarized political identities (shown in figures 1 and 2 above) allows us to better integrate these values into our proposals. While trying to integrate the perceived political *interests* of all sides is often impossible, integrating the *values* of each side, even if only partially, can lead to new forms of agreement.

A prime example of values integration is found in the issue of gay marriage. Advocacy for the right to marry has been the key to the larger success of the gay rights movement because the cause of gay marriage integrates important values from each of the four major value systems illustrated in figures 1 and 2: Gay marriage advances postmodern liberation values, liberal fairness values, libertarian freedom values, and crucially, traditional family values. Traditionalists who otherwise object to 'decadent homosexual lifestyles' find it much harder to resist calls for the basic right to make a family commitment through the institution of marriage. While perceived traditionalist interests are not included in the new right for gays to marry, traditionalist values are included nonetheless. It was thus through values integration that this once-polarized issue has not only become law, it has also gained widespread social acceptance.

Another example of a political cause that is achieving success by integrating values from across the spectrum is the legalization of marijuana. Like gay marriage, legal pot integrates postmodern liberation values with libertarian freedom values, and again crucially, it also integrates the conservative value of federalism, which seeks to allow local populations to determine political questions such as prohibition.

In the same way that values integration explains the recent success, even within our polarized political culture, of issues like gay marriage and legal marijuana, the lack of adequate values integration helps explain why other issues remain stuck. The issue of climate change, for example, has yet to achieve much political success because its advocates have failed to adequately integrate the values of the right side of the spectrum into their cause. In their otherwise admirable efforts to preserve the environment, climate change activists often repudiate modernist prosperity values and traditional conservation values. As I discuss at length in another paper, the strident anti-modernism of the postmodern leaders of the climate change movement has resulted in strong resistance from those on the right, who would be less opposed to action on climate change if their values were better integrated into this issue's policy proposals.

Again, while integrating opposing interests to the satisfaction of both sides is often impossible in our polarized politics, opposition can be more easily overcome where values are

integrated, even if perceived interests are not. In addition to climate change, the stuck issue of immigration could likewise move forward if the left's values of fairness and liberation were better combined with conservative heritage values (promoting immigrant assimilation) and libertarian meritocracy values (favoring immigrants with talent and resources).

While a detailed discussion of issue-specific values integration tactics is beyond the purview of this paper, there is one more issue that is worth mentioning in this context. America's growing income inequality and the diminution of our middle class is among our biggest challenges. While income inequality is a complex problem whose solution is multifaceted, one promising proposal that would undoubtedly help is known as 'basic income'

or 'guaranteed minimum income.' Although still far from being politically viable, like gay marriage, the policy proposal for a basic income for all citizens integrates values from across the political spectrum.

This new practice of values integration is really a 'higher form of centrism'

A basic income would provide a degree of economic liberation while also helping families by empowering

those who want to devote more time to caring for children or aging parents. This policy would also provide a fairer alternative to many entitlement programs. And by eliminating much of the bureaucracy costs associated with administrating a means-tested welfare state, it could reduce the size of government. The basic income issue's ability to integrate diverse values is demonstrated by the fact that it has prominent supporters on both sides. It has been advocated on the right by Friedrich Hayak, Milton Friedman, and Charles Murray, and on the left by Martin Luther King Jr., Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Thomas Paine. <sup>12</sup>

There are many similar political issues that could be forwarded by better integrating the values of left and right. But these examples begin to illustrate the potential of the political practice of values integration.

#### Conclusion

America's debilitating hyper-partisan polarization is a problem we must overcome. Yet the most obvious solution of centrist compromise remains politically unviable. Contemporary centrist political perspectives lack the persuasive power to overcome polarization because their underpinning ideology of patriotism—compromising for the good of the country—has been eroded by the rise of progressive postmodernism as a political force. While moderate centrism has always relied more on pragmatic reason than ideological passion, the old modernist center is now being increasingly pulled apart on both sides by strongly ideological competing moral systems.

However, as the progressive postmodern worldview gains political ground (as evidenced by the strength of Bernie Sander's candidacy), this points to the potential for the rise of a 'post-postmodern' political perspective that can provide a 'higher form of centrism'—a larger cultural container that can integrate and harmonize the full spectrum of positive American values. As outlined above, this higher form of centrism includes the new political practice of values integration, which involves working to increase the scope of what people can value. Moreover, this new political practice of values integration shows how even where perceived interests are seemingly irreconcilable, stuck issues can nevertheless move forward when the underlying values of opposing sides are carefully integrated into policy proposals.

In the years ahead, whichever political party can most effectively embrace this higher form of centrism will eventually become the governing party. And this emerging political perspective may even give rise to a new third party. Throughout American history third parties have consistently failed because they have lacked the 'ideological juice' necessary to garner loyalty and build political will. But the needed ideological energy that could provide the foundation for a successful third party (or a reformed Republican or Democratic party) can now be found within this higher form of centrism that can better integrate the full spectrum of American values and thereby achieve greater political cooperation.

#### **Notes**

- 1. See Steve McIntosh, "Principles of the Evolutionary Worldview" (2014) http://www.culturalevolution.org/docs/ICE-Philosophy.pdf; McIntosh, "Overcoming Political Polarization by Evolving Both Right and Left" (2016) http://www.culturalevolution.org/docs/ICE-Evolving-Right-and-Left.pdf; and McIntosh and Carter Phipps, "Depolarizing the American Mind," (2014) http://www.culturalevolution.org/docs/ICE-Depolarizing-American-Mind.pdf.
- 2. While the word 'postmodern' has been used in a narrower sense to describe art movements or critical forms of academic discourse, this term is also increasingly used more broadly as a general description of the distinct cultural worldview that has emerged beyond modernism in many parts of the developed world. Those who identify with this progressive postmodern worldview, sometimes called 'cultural creatives' or 'post-materalists,' ascribe to a well-defined set of values that contrasts with both traditionalism and modernism.
- 3. Not all supporters of Bernie Sanders are culturally postmodern, many are left-leaning working class modernists who are not particularly countercultural. But Sanders' own background as a countercultural progressive politician has helped him energize and mobilize the postmodern demographic segment of American society, and this segment clearly makes up a large part of his constituency.
- 4. See John Avlon, *Wingnuts: How the Lunatic Fringe Is Hijacking America*. (Perseus Books Group 2010), pp. 1-3 and 238-39. See also: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radical\_centrism.
- 5. See George Lakoff, "Why Trump?" (March 2, 2016) https://georgelakoff.com/2016/03/02/why-trump.
- 6. See Hawkins, C. B. & Nosek, B. A., "Motivated independence? Implicit party identity predicts political judgments among self-proclaimed Independents" *Personality and Social Psychology*

Bulletin, 18 2012, 1441-1455. See also Alan Abramowitz, "The Partisans in the Closet: Political independents are (mostly) a figment of your imagination" in *Politico* (January 8, 2014) http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/01/independent-voters-partisans-in-the-closet-101931\_Page2.html. This tendency to lean to one side or the other can be compared to trying to find the middle of a magnet; balance is difficult to maintain as one is always pulled toward one pole or the other.

- 7. See Mark Satin, "Where's the Juice?: Review of Ted Halstead and Michael Lind's *The Radical Center: The Future of American Politics*," in *The Responsive Community* (Vol. 12, Issue 4, 2002) https://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/rcq/issues/12-4.pdf.
- 8. For the social science research demonstrating the existence of the values-based worldviews of traditionalism, modernism, and postmodernism see: Ronald Inglehart, ed., *Human Values and Social Change* (Brill, 2003); Paul Ray and Sherry Anderson, *The Cultural Creatives: How 50 Million People Are Changing the World* (Harmony Books, 2000). See also: Clare W. Graves, "Levels of Existence: An Open System Theory of Values," in *Journal of Humanistic Psychology* (November 1970); and Jenny Wade, *Changes of Mind: A Holonomic Theory of the Evolution of Consciousness* (SUNY Press, 1996).
- 9. George Nash, "The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America: Then and Now" in *The National Review* (April 26, 2016). http://www.nationalreview.com/article/434548/conservative-intellectuals-george-nash?tmSBC4Ud0HH4HfZ4.01.
- 10. Reverse patriotism can be clearly seen in the work of Noam Chomsky, Oliver Stone, Amy Goodman, Howard Zinn, Chris Hedges, Slavoj Žižek (internationally), and a host of similar leftists who are the political heroes of many progressive postmodernists.
- 11. See ICE's "Campaign Plan for Climate Change Amelioration" (2013) http://www.culturalevolution.org/docs/ICE-Climate-Plan.pdf.
- 12. For more on basic income see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basic\_income, and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guaranteed\_minimum\_income. Also, special thanks to my ICE colleagues Richard Tafel and Carter Phipps for their contribution to this values integration thinking.

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